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A Postmodern' s Hart: Taking Rules Sceptically
Allan C. Hutchinson*
It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances. The mystery of the world is the
visible, not the invisible.

Although

considered

Oscar Wilde

somewhat

passe

in the recherche

circles of

jurisprudential scholarship, H.L.A. Hart's view of law as basically a ruleapplying activity remains the guiding theme of many legal practitioners and
doctrinal scholars. The fact that his writings are no longer thought of as
innovative or exceptional is only testament to their pervasive acceptance as part
and parcel of what it is to be and think like a lawyer. Of course, this should
not be surprising. His work was informed by the Austin -Wittgenstein
imperative that good philosophy was simply making sense of people's daily
linguistic practices: The Concept of Law was offered as 'an essay in
descriptive sociology.' 1 As such, his juristic studies recommended themselves
to the practical mind of the common lawyer; there was an intuitive and
reassuring fit between what lawyers thought they were doing and what they
were told that they should be doing. The fact that Bart's uncluttered writings
also justified and set to rest any qualms about the legitimacy of lawyers' and
judges' roles in a liberal democracy also helped. Showcased by the elegant
simplicity of his writing, Hart's elevation of legal common sense to the status of
jurisprudential theory is both his greatest strength and his greatest weakness. 2
Over thirty years after the publication of his majestic monograph, Hart has

*

Professor and Associate Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
I would like to thank Harry Arthurs, Adam Bernstein, Richard Devlin, Howard Goldstein, Les Green, Rod
Macdonald, Pam Marshall, Francis Mootz III, Sid Peck, Lisa Philipps, Richard Posner and Jim Smith for
their critical encouragement, and Wendy Rambo for her technical assistance.

posthumously rejoined the debate over the nature of law and adjudication. In a new
and previously unpublished Postscript, incorporated in a second edition, Hart
responds to some of his old adversaries, like Lon L. Fuller, Ronald Dworkin and
John Finnis. In the process he adds a new spark to the debate and stokes the flame
of analytical jurisprudence. While the differences between their positions and his
own are important Hart contends that they are not as great or significant as many
have come to believe. With characteristic equanimity and balance, Hart maintains
that, shorn of exaggeration and caricature, there is much to recommend his
adversaries: the problem lies not so much in their basic tenets, but in their
hegemonic tendencies. Nevertheless, the postscript is a posthumous and
unequivocal affirmation of Hart's own special brand of analytical jurisprudence
that law and morality are best kept separate; that rules are the heart and soul of the
legal process; and that adjudication has an inescapable element of choice. 3
This essay proceeds on the raison d 'etre that the past and its heroes are better
respected through active engagement than through passive veneration. I want to
put a revived Hart to work in the hectic world of contemporary concerns rather
than leave him to be admired as an historical curiosity in the jurisprudential Hall of
Fame. Such an undertaking can illuminate a very different Hart from the one
caricatured in contemporary legal literature. Rather than be the country bumpkin
to contemporary theory's urbane sages, he appears as a much more prescient and
balanced theorist. To do this, I offer a postmodern reading of Hart; it is more a
review than a review. By this, I do not mean that I will attempt to demonstrate
that Hart was really a postmodernist at heart (although such a challenge is
tempting). Instead, I will read Hart from an avowedly postmodern perspective -

the fact that some of my conclusions may not be seen lo fit snugly with those
that many think are crucial to the Hartian canon is beside the point.
The critical focus of this postmodern rendition is the always topical and
perennially contested notion of what it means to take rules seriously. Working with
Hart's mature theory, I will follow through, more fully than he did, on his primary
insight that legal language is a social activity that depends on convention and
context for meaning. As convention and context are never historically stable and
always socially contestable, I argue that the meaning and application of legal rules
cannot be put beyond the possibility of disputation or the need for defence. In
defending this view of law as an incorrigibly indeterminate exercise, I will not take
Hart's theory lightly, but actually take more seriously than he did his remark that
'rules cannot provide for their own application, and even in the clearest case a
human being must apply them. '4 And this is no bad democratic thing. In a society
that aspires to more popular involvement and less elite control, rules are taken
most seriously when they are treated most sceptically. Consequently, by pursuing
this postmodern commitment, I will be better able to defend a Hartian-inspired
sceptical thesis against the contending triad of contemporary jurisprudential
approaches the arch-positivists, the neo-naturalists and the so-called nihilists.
This article is divided into three main sections. In the first, I locate Hart's
positivistic account of adjudication within the configurations of contemporary
jurisprudential debate that Hart's writings themselves helped to establish. The
second section has a threefold structure: the first part unearths the linguistic
footings of Ordinary Language philosophy on which Hart built his juristic edifice;
the second shifts the critical emphasis from Hart's concern with 'textual

ambiguity' to a more radical exposure of law's 'structural indeterminacy'; and the
third gives a more practical rendering of that theoretical critique. In the third
section, I play out the implications of this shift for the resolution of easy cases and
for the practice of a sceptical judging. Finally, in a short conclusion, I draw
together the strands of the sceptical argument and consider their combined effect
on contemporary legal theorising. Throughout, I use Hart's famous example of the
rule that 'no vehicles may be taken into the park' 5 to illustrate and test the force
of Hart's and my own general claims.

The Hart of the matter
Throughout Hart's diverse oeuvre, the connecting thread is his positivistic
insistence that law and morality are best kept separate if the study of either is to
be profitable and instructive. He has played a leading role in the three major
debates in jurisprudence over the last fifty years. 6 I intend to concentrate on
the third of these exchanges about the nature of adjudication and, in particular,
the operation and limits of rule application as a method of legal decisionmaking how is it possible to get beyond a discredited formalism without
turning judging into an open-ended exercise in ideological wrangling? Hart's
prominence in this debate is ironic in that he later concluded that he said
'far too little about the topic of adjudication and legal reasoning. '7 Indeed,
the main thrust of his work is to present a more sophisticated theory of
positivism than had hitherto been available and in which an explanation of
adjudication would only be a small part. As such, The Concept of Law captures
a special kind of positivism; the fact that it is now considered the positivistic

account of law should not blind contemporary readers to its original novelty and
controversiality. As well as believing that there are no noncontingent
connections between Jaw and morality, Hart crafted a style of legal
positivism that was more normative in content than Austin's and more pluralist
in scope than Bentham's. 8 However, rather than range broadly across the
whole Hartian positivistic terrain, I will only touch upon such general
themes as they relate specifically to adjudication and rule application.
Moreover, in light of the widespread familiarity with Hart's work, my initial
introduction will be brief and to the sceptical point.

A good night's sleep
Hart's concern is not with the internal perspective of how and why lawyers
(and citizens) do what they do in particular legal cultures, but that of an
external observer of law and legal systems generally. However, while
theorists need not endorse the viewpoint of participants in the system to
be understood, he does recognise that it is essential that theorists record the
participants' normative views and commitments: 'description may still be
description, even when what is described is an evaluation. '9 As such,
although his theoretical stance is resolutely external, Hart's positivism is of a
soft variety. He does not maintain that the truth of legal propositions is
reducible to bare historical facts, but acknowledges that values can be fully
implicated: 'the existence and content of law can be identified by reference to
the social sources of law . . . without reference to morality except where the
law thus identified has itself incorporated moral criteria for the

identification of law. '10 Within these positivistic parameters, Hart depicts law
as a functional and sophisticated system of rules the obligation-imposing
primary rules that comprise the bulk of substantive legal doctrine, like
criminal and contract law, and the authority-conferring secondary rules that
distribute institutional power and jurisdiction, between legislatures and courts
for example, over the creation and enforcement of the primary rules. In both
cases, in keeping with his general theoretical perspective, Hart insisted that
rules had to be distinguished from merely observable regularities of behaviour.
For participants in the system, rules operate 'as the basis for claims, demands,
admissions, criticism or punishment' and 'the violation of a rule is not merely a
basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but as reason for
hostility.' 11 Without reference to this internal attitude that lawyers and citizens
exhibit towards rules, a vital element of jurisprudential understanding would
be lost. In the Hartian scheme of things, therefore, a cogent explanation of
legal obligation is as much about attitude and acceptance as it is about fate
and fiat.
Against this analytical backdrop, Hart developed a suggestive account of
adjudication; it was a description of what occurs, not a prescription for what
might or should occur. In typical fashion, he made a virtue of compromise.
Presenting a reasoned and reasonable account of modern judging, he
unashamedly sought to inhabit a middle-ground between formalist pitfalls and
realist excesses: 'legal theory . . . is apt either to ignore or to exaggerate the
indeterminacies of legal rules.'
realist account of adjudication

12

Almost all commentators accepted that the

'that judges always make and never find the law' was a nightmare to be
avoided. Instead, debate was joined over the extent to which the noble dream
of a formalist faith 'that Uudges] never make it' could be revived and
revised. Throughout his contribution, Hart accepted that, while these
'illusions . . . have much of value to teach the jurist in his waking hours,' 13
the sensible lawyer will settle for a good night's sleep. He wanted to
ensure that legal theory would abandon some of its more recent nocturnal
fantasies so that legal practice would be able to get on with its day job in a
refreshed and undistracted way.

·

Hart's patented jurisprudential formula for a legal good night's sleep is
prosaic and pragmatic. While not claiming to offer a full-blown theory of
adjudication, he considered rule application to be at the heart of the judicial
task. Empowered to apply rules in order to resolve disputes between
conflicting citizens, the hallmark of 'good' judges is their ability to identify
the extant rules of the legal system and apply them to concrete situations.
Nonetheless, this craft is not a purely technical or logical exercise. In a
famous phrase, Hart argued that law has an 'open texture. "4 Because law, like
language, is an entirely conventional affair and convention is neither gapless
nor precise, this system of rules cannot be complete or comprehensive: some
cases, therefore, will be 'not merely . . . controversial in the sense that
reasonable and informed lawyers may disagree about which answer is legally
correct, but the law is fundamentally incomplete' (p 252). Consequently, these
so-called 'hard cases' will invoke and require non-conventional decisionmaking
processes. In fulfilling their duties, judges have to call on a variety of

analytical skills and reasoning techniques: they act inductively when they
extract rules from a line of past cases; they act deductively when they apply
the inductively-extracted rule to the case in point; and they act politically
when the inductively-extracted rule or its deductive application is uncertain or
difficult. In this unpretentious account of judging, indeterminacy is something
that pervades the judicial task, but it is always relative, marginal and not to
be exaggerated. Accordingly, Hartian judges are not mindless automatons,
Delphic oracles, wellmeaning simpletons, rampant legislators or cynical
manipulators; they struggle to do justice in a way that respects rules without
becoming enslaved to them. To the chagrin of the dogmatist and the true
believer, they are 'men [and women], not gods' nor, it might be added,
beasts. 15
The first stage of Hartian adjudication is the inductive extraction of the
appropriate rule; this is the precedential soul of the common law. Although
there are 'a vast number of determinate rules' and this exercise will be
productive of 'very little doubt,' Hart concedes that 'any honest description'
will recognise considerable leeway for judicial involvement.

16

Consequently,

even at this first stage, indeterminacy is a characteristic feature of the
adjudicative process -there is no one correct or authoritative method for
determining the relevant precedent from among the many competing lines of
cases, the rule for which a particular precedent stands, the precise verbal
formulation of that rule, or the exceptions to that rule.
Having formulated the relevant rule (and its exceptions) with sufficient
precision, the judge must then set about applying that rule to the facts of the

case. This is the dynamic hub of the judicial undertaking. Neither absolute
faith in the dispositive force of rules nor arbitrary disregard of them are part
of the Hartian dialectic. While rule application is not a purely mechanical or
logical operation, a genuine commitment to its consistent practice means that
'human conduct is made in some sense non-optional or obligatory. '17 To apply a
rule is not to make routine recourse to the consequences that attend such an
application. Whenever one regularly does so, it undermines the practice and
legitimacy of rule application generally: the judge ceases to be engaged in rule
application, but is instead making a post hoc resort to the rule as a justification
for a particular consequence which is compatible with the rule and which is not
offensive as a matter of justice. For Hart, although an attention to consequences
may be required in some cases, this is better done openly rather than under the
pretence of rule application:
None the less, the life of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both of
officials and private individuals by determinate rules which, unlike the applications of
variable standards, do not require from them a fresh judgment from case to case. This salient fact
of social life remains true, even though uncertainties may break out as to the applicability of any
rule (whether written or communicated by precedent) to a concrete case. Here at the margin of
rules and in the fields left open by the theory of precedents, the courts perform a rule-producing
elaboration of variable standards. 18

While the parameters and sources of this rule-producing responsibility have
varied across the Hartian canon, his mature advice was that this power to
legislate interstitially is not to be performed in a vacuum or done in an
arbitrary or ideological way. When legal rules fail or run out, judges are not
somehow out on their own but are subject to 'a wide variety of individual and

social interests, social and political aims, and standards of morality and
justice'

19

that are encompassed in the working norms of legal doctrine.

Indeed, it is the development and refinement of these 'criteria of relevance
and closeness of resemblance . . . [that] characterise whatever is specific or
peculiar in legal reasoning. '20 While there is no uniquely correct result,
judicial choice is a rational and constrained process in which 'many decisions
can be clearly ruled out as incorrect' 21 and in which the failure to ensure real
or idealised unanimity among judges is not fatal.
In the most important part of The Concept of Law' s new postscript, Hart
accepts that Dworkinesque principles are indeed part of the law, but denies
that there is any sharp contrast between non-conclusive principles and all-ornothing rules: 'the distinction is a matter of degree. '22 However, Hart does
not believe that positivism is devastated by this concession because, when
properly understood, a legal system's ultimate criteria of legal validity the
rule of recognition can easily and legitimately accommodate moral values.
That having been said, he insists that there is little to distinguish Dworkin's
holistic interpretive criterion of legal integrity from his own recommended
judicial way of proceeding. Judges must still offer general justificatory
reasons for their decisions and, often proceeding by analogy, 'ensure that the
new law they make, though it is new law, is in accordance with principles or
underpinning reasons recognised as already having footing in the existing
law. '23 Nevertheless, even the most Herculean of judges will occasionally
have to fall back on their own moral instincts and political beliefs:
Though this procedure certainly defers, it does not eliminate the moment for judicial
lawmaking, since in any hard case different principles supporting competing analogies may

present themselves and a judge will often have to choose between them, relying, like a
conscientious legislator, on his sense of what is best and not on any already established order of
priorities prescribed for him by law.24

While Hartian judges might become adept at the independent crafts of rule
application and rule production, the acid test of the truly gifted Hartian
judges is their astuteness of knowing when to move from rule application to
rule production. While this does not lend itself to formulaic instruction or
structured learning, Hart does rely on the heuristic distinction between 'clear
cases' and 'hard cases' to guide the perplexed judge through this critical maze
and to maintain some chance of a good night's sleep. However, this instruction
is somewhat empty as he admits that it is a matter of considerable difficulty
to provide an exhaustive account of what makes a 'clear case' clear and what
makes a 'hard case' hard. Nevertheless, he observes, somewhat tautologically,
that clear cases are those occasions on which there is general agreement and
very little doubt that the facts in issue obviously fall within the meaning and
scope of a rule. Hard cases, therefore, must be those cases in which such
general agreement is lacking and there are real doubts about the applicability of
a rule. As with nearly all of Hart's work, the distinction is not so much a matter
of conceptual analysis, but an observed fact about the empirical behaviour of
judges and the functional operation of language:
Even when verbally formulated general rules are used, uncertainties as to the form of
behaviour required by them may break out in particular concrete cases. Particular fact
situations do not await us already marked off from each other and labelled as instances of the
general rule, the application of which is in question; nor can the rule itself step forward to
claim its own instances. In all fields of experience, not only that of rules, there is a limit,
inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance which general language can provide.

There will indeed be plain cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which general
expressions are clearly applicable ('If anything is a vehicle a motor car is one'), but there will
also be cases where it is not clear whether they apply or not. ('Does "vehicle" used here
include bicycles, airplanes, roller skates?')25

Again, however, Hart has not been entirely consistent about the empirical
distribution of these clear and hard cases or, therefore, about the extent to which
judicial choice is present and unavoidable. While he began with the opinion in
1958 that 'how rare . . . [and] how exceptional is this feeling that one way of
deciding a case is imposed upon us as the only natural or rational elaboration of
some rule' and that the language of choice 'better conveys the realities of the
situation,' he appears to have repudiated that view by 1983 and settled on the
conclusion that the standard resort to rule application occurred 'very often' and
was the primary device for legitimate adjudication.

26

It seems to follow,

therefore, that while Hart contends that 'a margin of uncertainty should be
tolerated and indeed welcomed, '27 he is also confirming that, for the positivist
claim to hold true, there must be an operational degree of certainty. This
conclusion seems vital if Hart is to maintain the integrity and validity of his
accounts of law generally and judging in particular. Without a critical mass of
standard meanings and settled rules, the very idea that rules would control judicial
decisions, that there exists an actual body of workable rules, that such rul/es would
command authoritative conformity, that judging is something less than legislative
policy-making, and that there is some meaningful distinction between the law as
it is and the law as it ought to be, would all be lost. For Hart, therefore, while
legal theory and training will understandably be occupied with the penumbra,
'preoccupation with the penumbra is . . . as rich a source of confusion . . . as

[preoccupation with] formalism. '28
Of course, the fact that rules are not always dispositive of cases or that there
is considerable scope for judicial choice and innovation is not presented by Hart
as a matter of genuine concern. Indeed, he welcomes the fact that there is an
inevitable and relative indeterminacy or open texture in the law: the loss of
complete certainty and predictability is the price that has to be paid for the law
being flexible enough to handle unanticipated cases in a fair and just manner.
The challenge for both the judge and jurist is to strike an appropriate and
manageable balance between the rule application of clear cases and the rule
production of hard cases such that certainty is not sacrificed entirely to
particularised flexibility. On this issue, Hart is adamant that, if clear cases did
not comprise the bulk of adjudicated decisions, 'we should not attach
significance and value to them or think of such decisions as reached
29

through a rational process. '

Accordingly, Hart's writings present judging

as a balanced and judicious affair it is rational without being scientific,
flexible without being unbounded, judgmental without being arbitrary and
predictable without being predetermined.

Rude awakenings
In the thirty years since the original publication of The Concept of Law, the
focus of jurisprudential attention has become (trans)fixed on the adjudicative
function; what was once merely a small part of the juristic project has become
its almost total concern. While Hart's ideas are no longer thought to be
entirely pertinent to the contemporary agenda of pressing issues, legal

theorists have not so much rejected Hart's rule-based positivistic account of
adjudication as tried to qualify it in various ways. Taking a leaf from the
litigator's notebook, they have tried to both confess (rules are important in
law) and avoid (rules are not exhaustive of law) the force of Hart's claims.
Critics and defenders alike have retained Hartian positivism's central article of
faith namely, that rules are the basic currency of legal transactions and that
they have a core meaning that can deal with and resolve most situations. Even
the most anti-positivistic jurist, like Dworkin, accepts that there are frequent
occasions on which a rule 'applies itself

30

and even the most pragmatic

theorist, like Posner, embraces the idea that the skill to apply rules in a
creative way and to make that application persuasive to others is the hallmark
of the good lawyer and judge. 31 However, the efforts to qualify and distinguish
Hart have not been trivial. They can be grouped into two main trends a
naturalist resurgence and a positivistic retrenchment.
The great majority of jurists has sought to envelop an understanding of law
and adjudication in a larger and more expansive moral universe. Although
Hart was accurate in observing that rules were open-textured and their
application did not exhaust the judicial function, these neo-naturalist jurists
argue that he failed to appreciate the extent to which the law consists of
more than rules. Behind and within the rules is a political morality that guides
and constrains judges when the application of rules was unclear or undesirable.
Law was about values and politics, but not in any idiosyncratic or ideological
way. The primary task of theorists and judges is to detect and cultivate the
politico-moral principles that breathe life into the dry bones oflegal rules. For

some, the legal process is a subtle economic game in which the invisible hand
of the market shapes and wields legal rules in the best approximation of wealth
maximisation; for others, legal doctrine is a morality play in which individual
rights struggle with collective interests over the soul of constitutional justice;
and for still others, the courts represent a privileged site for a continuing civic
dialogue over the possibilities and parameters of democratic governance. 32
A smaller group of jurisprudential scholars has maintained that Hart fudged
on the moral basis of law. Agreeing that Hart's attempt at compromise was
not a triumph, but a sell-out, they concluded that Hart was a radical in
traditionalist's clothing who had reneged on the democratic compact by letting
the political cat out of the legal bag. However, rather than salvage the legal
enterprise by mixing in more morality, these arch-positivists seek to redeem
the democratic legitimacy of law by purifying it of any moral entanglements.
Such a hard variety of positivism treats law exclusively as a matter of social
fact and not a moral ideal. 33 While not everything judges say or do is law,
their application of legal rules not only can but must be free of moralising; to
do more (or less) would be improper, unjudicial and undemocratic. This is not
so much an amoral stance as a moral position that defends a legalism of
strictly rule-bound adjudication as the most morallydefensible account of law
and adjudication in a constitutional democracy. It is a vision of judging that
celebrates the systemic virtues of regularity, predictability and certainty over
the concern with substantive justice in particular instances. In one of its most
uncompromising incarnations, Justice Scalia insists that '[t]here are times
when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.'34

In spite of their obvious differences, these conflicting naturalist and
positivist trends are united in their shared and enduring formalistic belief that
there must be a clear and defensible line between valid adjudication and
ideological disputation. Both

maintain

that

legal

reasoning

is

a

sufficiently detached and determinate enterprise that can generate correct
and predictable answers to social disputes in a way that marks it off, in a
non-trivial and meaningful way, from open-ended political wrangling.
While immersed in politics and history, law is its own thing and not entirely
reducible to anything else. Without such a possibility, the fear is that the
Rule of Law will be subverted and democratic governance will succumb to
the tyranny of special interest groups. Moreover, without adequate
determinacy in legal discourse, judicial arbitrariness will become the order
of the day and adjudication will collapse into a series of ad hoc and
unprincipled encounters. Accordingly, positivists and naturalists agree that
the preservation of the Rule of Law 'has the value of promising to make
politics safe, of preventing Leviathan from becoming Frankenstein's
monster . . . [of imposing] real restraints on arbitrariness or despotic
conduct. '35
The important question for both the positivist and the naturalist account is
not whether law in large part can be represented as the application of clear
rules wrapped up in intelligible doctrine, but whether it ever can be so. It is my
sceptical contention that it cannot. Supported by a postmodern reading of
Hart, I resist the claim that there is an abiding core meaning to rules that can
be located and relied upon in applying them. While there is always a topical

distinction between the core of a rule's meaning and its penumbral
uncertainty at any particular moment, this relation between core and penumbra
is contingent and cannot provide the stability and fixity that its proponents
suggest and require; yesterday's penumbra is today's core which will be
tomorrow's penumbra. People bring different experiences to rules and,
therefore, interpret and follow them differently: there is no uniformity of
experience and, therefore, no uniform experience of what it is to follow a
rule. Any claim that judges are only held back from a frenzy of arbitrariness
by the restraining power of rules is not only unrealistic, but also does scant
credit to the integrity and efforts of most judges.
In the process of explicating what a postmodern application of rules entails,

I will defend my version of rule scepticism against the exaggerated claims
of the third strain in contemporary jurisprudential criticism -the so-called
nihilists. This disaffected small group has let their critical zeal overcome their
intellectual insight. They have pursued an extreme line of hyper-sceptical
argument which has exacerbated the formalist fear that, without some
plausible account of determinate rule following, there will be an official
anarchy .in which rules will count for nothing or simply be used as ex post
rationalisations for ex ante decisions. For instance, Tushnet concedes too
much when he states that if he were appointed to the bench he would adopt a
'currently fashionable theory' of adjudication and then use it to advance the
cause of socialism or whatever.

36

This fails to take the legal enterprise

seriously and offers no real challenge to its theoretical legitimacy. After all, as
Hart insists, the judges' experience of actually applying rules must be

incorporated into and explained by any cogent account of adjudication.
Moreover, a nihilistic perspective persists in the error that judges can step out
of themselves and adopt some view from a legal nowhere. In contrast, I
contend that the judges are both more and less constrained by rules than any
of the positivists, naturalists and nihilists think. They are more constrained in
the sense that they cannot land completely outside of rules and exercise an
entirely free choice, but they are less constrained in the sense that they are not
obliged to reach any particular decision as the result of a commitment to
resolve disputes through rule application.
Contrary to a nihilist perspective, therefore, I maintain that nothing is lost
to the radical critic (and everything is to be gained) by taking the legal
enterprise seriously. Of course, this is provided that taking law and
adjudication seriously means doing so in a postmodern way. It is not so
much that rules do not exist, but that they do not exist as canonical directives
whose meaning is available without interpretation and which can
impersonally dispose of cases. The meaning of a rule and its application
never simply is it is something to be argued for or with and not something to
be argued from. As conventional and social matters, the meaning and
application of rules is contextual and, therefore, open. The fear of rule-free
choice is as contrived as faith in rule-bound choice.
In presenting a postmodern's Hart, therefore, I defend a modest and
Hartianinspired position that is situated between the excesses of both a
naturalist and a positivist approach on the one side, and a nihilist critique of
law and adjudication on the other. In other words, I will articulate a critical

account of lawyering and judging that takes rules seriously in the only way
that they can be taken seriously as a special kind of activity or game which is
defined by rules and roles, but in which the nature and effect of those rules
and roles are themselves always in play. Such an account will consolidate the
traditional rejection by positivism of the naturalists' pretension to project law
as a seamless web of doctrinal filaments. As importantly, it will provide a
much-needed corrective to any tendency to present rule application as nothing
more than a transparent exercise in self-delusion.37 In the process, I will
explain how the concession that there is widespread predictability to the legal
and judicial process is not fatal or even embarrassing to the sceptical claim that
the body of legal rules is radically indeterminate. When properly understood,
the sceptical claim is not that 'anything goes,' but that 'anything might go.'

From ambiguity to indeterminacy
Hart's masterstroke was to introduce the linguistic lessons of Wittgenstein and
his Ordinary Language colleagues to the study of law. Indeed, Hart was one of
the first lawyers to take seriously the idea that law was a linguistic practice and that
the jurist's task was to clarify and elucidate the social use of legal statements
and linguistic practices. Consequently, his general jurisprudence and particular
account of judging is driven by and given much of its intellectual shape by his
understanding of language's role. He thus shifted the focus of jurisprudential
attention away from philosophical abstractions toward a more practical view of
law-as-social-activity. In the Hartian canon, law was not a heavenly body but had
feet of clay. However, in importing Wittgenstein's ideas to jurisprudence, Hart got

more than be bargained for. Intended as mild correctives to a tendency in
jurisprudence to abstraction, the notions of convention and context are a strong
form of theoretical purgative. Although Hart strives to confine their effects, such
debilitating ideas are fatal to many of the basic concepts upon which Hart builds
his theory of law.

A weak Hart
Until the late nineteenth century, language had generally been taken for granted.
Treated as a transparent medium through which, if used properly, the light of
meaning shone, it had eluded sustained or searching critique. Philosophers tended
to proceed as if words were incorporeal elements that existed in an abstract realm
whose unique meaning had to be revealed and refined. However, the advent of the
'linguistic turn' in philosophy brought an end to such naivety. While this concern
with language took many forms and directions, the most important for English
jurisprudence and Hart's positivism was the so-called Ordinary Language School
of Philosophy which drew its intellectual inspiration from the later writings of
Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein, many of philosophy's problems had been verbal
and self-imposed because theorists insisted on taking words out of their context
and separating them from their function: 'philosophical problems arise when
language goes on holiday. '38 Abandoning the idea that language had an enduring
relation to the world and that words' meanings were simply pictures of that
world, his major insight was that language was a human activity and that words
served different needs in different ways at different times. Accordingly,
meaning was to be understood through the word's function and the rules which

governed its use.
By way of the work of J.L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle,39 Hart set out to introduce
this bracing linguistic scepticism into the staid corner of juristic deliberation. In
his inaugural Oxford lecture in 1953, he cast grave doubts on the adequacy

°

and validity of attempts to supply a traditional definition per genus et
differentiam of law and basic legal conceptions: it was not possible to provide a
set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the use and meaning of a word.
Instead, he emphasised that such words as 'law' and 'right' do not stand for
any abstract entities or describe any pre-existing factual reality. 4 For Hart, the
relation between legal words and the world was neither straightforward nor
mirror-like. The adequacy oflegal definitions is not to be found in their
correctness, but in their usefulness to achieve the particular aim in question. As
such, the point of The Concept of Law was 'to advance legal theory by providing
an improved analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal legal system and
a better understanding of the resemblances and differences between law,
coercion and morality, as types of social phenomena. '41 Accordingly, Hart is
anti-reductionist in that he views legal terms as irreducible to hon-legal
language or some non-linguistic reality; Hartian jurisprudence is, therefore,
touted to be as much about sociology as philosophy and as much about
convention as universality.
Beginning from such a language-centred premise, Hart was persuaded that
jurisprudence should consist of attempts to elucidate the underlying and
recurrent themes of legal thinking through exposing the multitude of legal
shadows and ambiguities in habitual legal usage. This approach did not do away

with definitions entirely, but recommended a much less abstract and more
contextual analysis of legal language: definitions were to be general
approximations rather than final explanations and could not be used as
incontrovertible postulates from which conclusive axioms could be logically
inferred. Consequently, words like 'rule,' 'right' and 'legal person' could not be
defined by pointing to corresponding things or actions in the external world, but
could only be understood in terms of their legal function and social usage.
Hart urged that certain ground rules could be drafted and observed in giving
meaning to legal constructs: first, put them into the context of the whole sentence;
next, specify the conditions under which the whole sentence is true; and then,
show how that sentence is used in drawing a conclusion from the rules in a
particular case.
Nevertheless, the social factness of law will confound efforts to construct a
scientifically precise or purely abstract account of law. As a conventional
linguistic practice, law shares the imprecision and messiness of social life.
While there are better and worse ways to participate in and practice legal
language, there is no perfectible use of legal language. Any attempt to fix the
meaning of particular words will be defeated by people's 'relative ignorance
of fact . . . [and] relative indeterminacy of aim. '42 For Hart, people's inability to
predict or anticipate the future with confidence ensures that the struggle to
communicate in a clear and unambiguous manner is hubristic and, as such, is
doomed to failure: 'uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be paid for the
use of general classifying terms in any form of communication concerning
matters of fact. '43 Within the Hartian view of law, philosophical clarity is

bought at the price of practical uncertainty, and social determinacy at the
expense of theoretical legitimacy. However, while words must be understood
in their linguistic context and lack any absolutely determinate meaning, Hart
maintained that words do have a core of settled meaning; there are some
standard instances which guide their use. Without this sense that a particular
string of words 'fixes necessary conditions which anything must satisfy if it
is to be within the scope and certain clear examples of what is certainly
within its scope may be present to our minds, '44 communication would not
be possible. However, in Hart's view, outside their core of settled meaning or
standard instances, general statements will have a penumbra of indeterminacy,
a fuzzy border in which the bewildering interaction of wordly flux and human
ingenuity will confound attempts to give words sharp and clear-cut edges. In
such peripheral regions of uncertainty, general agreement in judgments about
meaning will have to be reached actively rather than simply recognised:
the classifier must make a decision which is not dictated to him, for the facts and phenomena to
which we fit our words and apply our rules are as it were dumb. Fact situations do not await
us neatly labelled, creased and folded, nor is their legal classification written on them to be
simply read off by the judge. Instead, in applying legal rules, someone must take the
responsibility of deciding that words do or do not cover some case in hand with all the
practical consequences involved in this decision.45

However

innovative and different Hart's resort to the themes

of

Wittgensteinian linguistic analysis appeared in the 1950s and 1960s to the
Anglo-American jurisprudential

establishment,

it

was

characteristically

cautious and considereo. In his inaugural lecture itself and later in The
Concept of Law, Hart hedged on the importance and implications of context

and function for linguistic analysis: they were more like helpful accessories
than fundamental tools for moving beyond a strictly 'representational'
understanding of language. For instance, although he argued that legal terms
are not used 'to stand for or describe anything,' they 'do not have the
straightforward connection with counterparts in the world of facts which most
ordinary words have and to which we appeal in our definition of ordinary
words. '46 Hart seems to think that the dependence of meaning on function
and context is a pecularity of formal systems of language, such as law and
games: law is an anomalous mode of expression. In view of this, he is fond
of talking about the 'natural expression' of certain concepts and points of
view as though their meaning was fixed and determinate across and among
different contexts. 47 He fails to appreciate that the contextual and functional
insight is as salient to the operation of the vast number of informal and
overlapping practices that comprise language as a whole. Moreover, without
such an acknowledgement, Hart's commitment to a truly functional and
contextual understanding of language is seriously attenuated and fatally
compromised. In so far as the content of Hart's use-based rules and rights draw
upon and connect to 'ordinary language,' the resort to context and function is
rendered marginal and insignificant.
This debilitating tendency is reinforced by Hart's indication of what it
means to take a contextual approach to legal language. His treatment of
sentences as the prime unit of meaning rather than as a series of isolated words
was only a first step. Hart went no further in his embrace of a contextual
analysis than to suggest that it was possible to attach meaning to legal

constructs by putting them in their larger grammatical context and by
recognising 'the cardinal principle that legal words can only be elucidated by
considering the conditions under which statements in which they have their
characteristic use are true. '48 This is little more than a cursory nod in the
direction of social usage; Hart remains indebted to a representational
understanding of language. He most certainly does not escape the 'picture'
theory of language, but only extends its range of brushes and palette of
colours. In so restricting contextual analysis, Hart comes almost as close to
talking about the truth conditions for linguistic application as those traditional
linguistic theories from which Wittgenstein was at pains to distinguish his own
work.49 Indeed,

while

Hart

dresses

his

theory

in

the

fashionable

Wittgensteinian trappings of social context and conventional usage, it is in its
essentials a traditional and objectifying body of ideas. Static, technical and
ahistorical in its understanding of social convention, The Concept of Law
lacks any appreciation of social life as dynamic and contingent.
For instance, Hart seems to believe that, at least as a metaphysical
possibility, language is capable of being unambiguous, provided that
sufficient information could be generated to overcome 'relative ignorance of
fact . . . [and] relative indeterminacy of aim. '50 There would be a transparency
between the words used to express speakers' intentions and the world
described by those words such that hearers could not be confused or unsure in
their understanding. In leaving open the possibility of such metaphysical
perfectibility, Hart does not live up to the sceptical expectations that his
Wittgenstein dalliance raises and encourages; The Concept of Law is a well-

intended but unsuccessful attempt to contain the subversive implications of a
thoroughly contextual and sceptical approach to law and language. Not only
does Hart fudge important questions about the historical and political
dynamism of language, he fails to understand that language is not only
textually ambiguous but is structurally indeterminate. Because 'a context,
always, remains open, thus fallible and insufficient, '51 context cannot do the
explanatory and justificatory work that Hart and others ask of it. As much as
context enables the possibility of any meaning at all, it disables the possibility
of a fixed or settled meaning.
Consequently, the next part of this section follows through on the sceptical
process that Wittgenstein began (but did not finish) of unburdening language
of its lingering metaphysical baggage and that Hart began (but did not finish)
of flushing out law's epistemological pretensions. My critique begins, not ends,
with the claim that meaning is ambiguous and multiple. From there, it goes
on to make a much more challenging set of claims about language and,
therefore,

law's

attachment

to rule

application. The

thrust

of

an

uncompromising sceptical critique is to ensure that rules are never the basis
of agreements, but that agreements are always the basis of rules.

A strong scepticism
Central to the resort to linguistic analysis was the possibility that it might
utilise language to plumb the epistemic depths of reality and necessity;
Aristotelian 'things' and Kantian 'minds' had not proved equal to the task.
The basic gamble was that philosophical problems could be resolved, or at

least eased, by taking language and its everyday use more seriously.
However, contrary to what Wittgenstein proclaimed, this endeavour only
demonstrated that language was as likely to bewitch our intelligence as
philosophy or anything else.52 There is no literal language one that is
representational rather than constitutive against which other languages, such
as law, can be contrasted. The study of language is not the last, best hope of
philosophy, at least as traditionally understood, because it is itself shot
through with all the contradictions and conundrums that philosophy strives
to resolve: it is a case of out of the philosophical frying pan and into the
linguistic microwave. If philosophy has any particular mission or ambition
(and I doubt that it has), it is not to isolate Truth or confirm The Way Things
Really Are, but to challenge old shibboleths and generate new and interesting
truths that better serve humanity's efforts to improve itself.
An old philosophical gloss does much to prick the balloon of
philosophical conceit and to highlight the way that language does (and does
not) work: 'to do is to be' Sartre; 'to be is to do' Nietzsche; and 'do be do
be do' Frank Sinatra. Both the point and the recitation of this gloss,
illustrating that language is very much a practice unto itself, contradicts the
claims and assumptions of many epistemologists. In particular, it highlights
traditional philosophy's failure to grasp fully the implications of the critical
idea that there might not be a transparency between the signifier and that to
be signified -there may be all kinds of contextual forces in play that
intervene. Discursive usage and practice are not the positivistic foundations
that Hart and others claim them to be; they are riddled with political and

social cracks. Language is not something that is a mirror or window to reality,
but is always part of that reality: language is constitutive rather than
designative. The relation of mind, language and things is not about causal
necessity but about functional adequacy. This is as much a matter of
prescriptive fit as descriptive accuracy.
Reality cannot be known outside of the discourse through which it is
apprehended. In a post-Kuhnian world, there are no theory-independent facts
or, what Wittgenstein termed,

'superlative fact(s)'53 that comprise an

unambiguous starting point for philosophical analysis; there is no object of
inquiry outside a context of inquiry. This insight is doubly valid for language
and law. There are no 'facts' about the way legal language works that are not
themselves beholden to some theory about what counts as law, language and
social facts. Of course, this is not to subscribe to the absurdly idealistic view
that there is no world which functions outside of language and that reality is
'begot of nothing but vain fantasy/ Which is as thin of substance as the air/
And more inconstant than the wind. '54 I argue that, beyond immediate and
personal sensations of the physical environment, the world is only accessible
and knowable through language; life is an interpretive activity. While
communicative practices are not the only kind of practices, they do frame and
give meaning to other practices and are important for

that reason.

Consequently, Hart's insistence that the meaning of certain words, like
'vehicle,' is somehow a fact, that its definition simply is and its authority is
self-evident, is not tenable: language and meaning are always hostage to their
historical and theoretical context.

Understanding language, therefore, is not about abstract reflection, but it is
about social activity. The key relation is between speakers rather than
between words and things: 'if language is to be a means of communication,
there must be agreements not only in definitions, but also (queer as this may
sound) in judgments' and, therefore, 'the speaking of language is part of an
activity, or a form of life. '55 For all his good intentions, Hart fails to follow
through on this fundamental Wittgensteinian insight. He treats ordinary
language as not only the first word, but also and this is the problem as the
last word on its philosophical significance. Contrary to Hart's view, ambiguity
in language is not the result of inadequate or imprecise attempts at definition,
but is a result of the systemic and structural problem that, as meaning depends
upon agreement, there is no sufficient or adequate common ground among
users of the language as to what particular words mean in particular
circumstances. The world of people and, therefore, of language is contingent; it
never stands still long enough to reach social consensus or historical closure.
This·view of language does not deny the possibility of meaning, but is
fundamentally sceptical about the status and stability of any meaning reached.
Thus, it is more easily understood that, while context manages to account for
the operation and intelligibility of language, it simultaneously manages to
undermine the possibility of grounding it in anything but context itself.56
While the judgments that stand behind and within language are not always
reflected upon, legal cases provide an occasion when they can be. Indeed,
unlike mathematics, law is an exercise in reflective activity.
While this sceptical approach to language rejects the notion of language as

an exercise in representational precision, it does not obliterate or essentialise
the distinction between discursive representation and reality, but renders it
organically unstable and normatively volatile. This is only fitting because
scepticism is sceptical about all things, including scepticism itself. But this
does not mean that sceptics disbelieve everything: this is as absurd as
suggesting that absolutists belive everything. Sceptics are sceptical about what
to be sceptical about. They hold beliefs, but in a provisional and conditional
way. Accordingly, to be sceptical is not to be relativistic; its notions of truths
are pluralistic and, cutting across and within social cultures, are not reductive
in epistemological provenance. 57 Moreover, as Hart again recognised but did
not fully grasp, it is not possible to develop a theory of meaning from such a
pragmatic conception of language. The ascertainment of meaning is never
reducible to some formulaic or fixed process of abstract reflection, but is
always susceptible to the vicissitudes of flawed and incomplete social
practices. A

sceptical or deconstructive enquiry

abandons entirely a

transcendental attachment or ambition to fix foundational conditions for
language. Instead, its task is to expose the dynamic fluidity of those
foundations. It is appropriately non-foundational rather than dogmatically antifoundational.
Consequently, whereas language is constitutive rather than designative,
contextual rather than abstract, and political rather than metaphysical, Hart's
claims about the 'relative indeterminacy '58 of law, in the sense of rules being
vague, ambiguous and competing, are misplaced. Law and language is
thoroughly and pervasively indeterminate. Whereas ambiguity suggests a

textural property that is capable of final resolution, indeterminacy represents a
discursive or linguistic property that pervades the whole interpretive act so
that

any

final resolution

or

interpretation

is unavailable. Structural

indeterminacy gives rise to a hermeneutical undecidability in the sense that
there can be no final closure to any claim for meaning. 59 Different meanings
are brought about by differences in context. There is no context of context in
that there will always be disagreement about what the proper context of any
law or rule is. Accordingly, it is the disagreement over context that creates the
ineradicable presence of indeterminacy. Interpretation is not a matter of
indisputable proofs that establish the term and conditions of legal language,
but a series of rhetorical probes in a continuing conversation about and within
legal discourse. This demands a refocusing of critical attention away from a
Hartian preoccupation with epistemological concepts to a sceptical concern
with social contexts.

A vehicle for indeterminacy
'Indeterminacy' is itself controversial even among those who subscribe to a
sceptical view of law. My own understanding is not reducible to the claim
that 'anything goes' at any time. It is most decidedly not a facile contention
that judges or lawyers are free to do whatever they wish: it is a claim about the
instability and undecidability of legal meanings as historical and political
phenomena. I reject the possibility of any sovereign and unconstrained
interpreter as I reject the possibility of any authoritative and constraining text.
Accordingly, claims that 'the court has complete discretion to achieve any

outcome at all' are fantastical and miss the whole point of a postmodern
perspective. 60 There is a difference between someone who is trying to make
sense of a particular text and generating multiple and contradictory meanings
and someone who is not making that effort at all and is self-consciously
grafting a gratuitous meaning onto a particular text. 61 Unlike the latter, the
former involves a good faith account of legal interpretation in which the
interpreter must hold a practical and actual belief that the law does permit
such a course of action. If there is, the debate over meaning will be joined as
one about substantive wisdom as opposed to interpretive correctness.
However, although insistence on the endemic instability of law does not
dictate that meaning is always elusive, it does hold that meaning's continuous
slippage and instability does prevent the establishment of any meaning that is
fixed and beyond further interpretative contestation. While meaning is always
parenthetical and can never be grounded, the possibility of meaningful
dialogue is always available: it is the theoretical status of such practical
meaning that is debatable. Interpretation is always constrained because, without
constraints, interpretation would not be possible. However, the constraints are
both always in place and never themselves outside of interpretation. There is
no politically uncontroversial or historically independent way of determining
that interpretation was correct or that the appropriate constraints are operative.
As such, the indeterminacy thesis is itself indeterminate. Law is indeterminate
not in relation to a stable social context, but because of the indeterminacy of
that social context. It is a non-instrumental account of law because it resists the
idea, shared by fundamentalist Marxist, feminist and Chicagoan theorists, that

it is possible to map with any certainty the correlation between the forces that
give rise to concrete interpretations of particular rules and doctrines and the
interests that those interpretations serve.62 It must be emphasised that
indeterminacy depends upon determinacy in that, in order to recognise
indeterminacy,

it is important that there is a contextual backdrop

of

determinacy against which indeterminacy can be identified. Accordingly,
what is and what is not indeterminate will shift. In a manner of speaking,
temporary and local determinacy is framed by lasting and general indeterminacy.
Legal meaning is a simultaneous mix of the determinate and indeterminate. In
Hartian terms, this translates into the acknowledgement that rules will be
experienced as having a core of accepted meaning and a penumbra of
uncertainty, but the identity of each will shift and change; what was once
thought to be at the core will become penumbra) and vice versa. The relation
between core and penumbra cannot be described once and for all: it is a sociohistorical artifact and cannot be reduced to a simple formula or overarching
narrative.

63

Whether particular interpretations of a rule are or are not

compatible is not the point. It is the fact that the question of their
compatibility is always open and contestable.
It takes little effort or imagination to illustrate this contingent and shifting
relation between the core and penumbral meaning of 'vehicle.' For Hart, it is clear
that 'if anything is a vehicle a motor car is one,' but it is equally unclear whether it
includes 'bicycles, airplanes, roller skates. '64 Although, at any particular time in
any particular place for any particular purpose for any particular community, this
delineation of vehicle's core and penumbra may accurately track the prevailing

consensus, it is difficult to sustain and defend this precise division as an enduring
account of vehicle's meaning. Even within a particularised context, there will be
debate and disagreement over not only whether penumbra! cases sufficiently
resemble core instances to warrant inclusion as vehicles, but also where the line
between core and penumbra is to be drawn does a motor car include a police
car, ambulance or maintenance vehicle? Does it encompass a child's toy, a
wheelchair, a child's stroller, a lawn mower or a statue of a motor car? 65
Moreover, Hart's injunction to consider words in their grammatical context is as
likely to result in further confusion as improved clarification -does 'park' include
an industrial estate as well as a recreational enclosure? Does it include a car park?
An extended historical example underlines the extent to which the core and
penumbra of words, like 'vehicle, ' shift and reconfigure in the effort to apply the
rule 'no vehicle may be taken into the park.' In the early part of the eighteenth
century (or before), the core and penumbra of vehicle clearly did not include motor
cars; they were not yet invented. It was animals and animal-drawn conveyances,
like wagons and sleds, that dominated the vehicular scene. For instance, in 1868,
pre-car London introduced traffic controls and pedestrian crossing signals. The
police notice warned that a manually-operated semaphore would indicate Stop or
Caution to 'all persons in charge of vehicles and horses. '66 Indeed, as late as 1925
in Washington, it was unclear whether the power 'to regulate vehicles on public
streets' encompassed automobiles as they were unknown as a practical means of
conveyance at the time of the regulation's original enactment in 1887.67
Ironically, by 1922 in Alabama, an animal unattached to a conveyance had been
held not to be a vehicle for the purposes of a statute authorising the confiscation of

vehicles used for criminal activities and, by 1925 in Virginia, animal-drawn
conveyances were not considered to be included within the ambit of vehicles. 68
Projecting forward a few decades into the next century, it is not inconceivable that
the motor car will have had its social day and have moved back into the penumbra!
regions of linguistic usage: it might be replaced by an environmentally-friendly
return to animals and animal-drawn carriages or by some futuristic means of
transport that has only presently begun to register faintly on the present social
consciousness.

The point of this example is not to demonstrate that 'anything goes,' but
that 'anything might go.' While meaning is always available, it is never
socially stable or historically fixed; historical contingency confounds linguistic
certainty. The settled possibility of establishing meaning at any particular time
is always haunted by the impossibility of settling on established meaning for
all time. My sceptical account urges, therefore, that it is entirely plausible to
believe in indeterminacy and, at the same time, still have confidence in
particular interpretations of particular rules at particular times in particular
circumstances, provided that such confidence is based upon rhetorical
cogency and not epistemological truth value. In Hartian terms, the attempt to
define 'vehicle' is not only periodically hampered by the word or rule's textual
ambiguity,

but

is

permanently

incapacitated

by language's structural

indeterminacy.
In such matters it is important that the question of law's indeterminacy is
not confused with its predictability. For instance, Greenawalt proposes,
as a justification for his claim that the law has a workable level of
determinacy, that 'virtually any lawyer . . . would conclude, after careful

study, that the law provides [a particular] answer. '69 Even this modest and
pragmatic standard is problematic

and

self-serving;

it

mistakes

predictability for determinacy. If 'virtually any lawyer' includes those
lawyers of a critical or deconstructive disposition, it will be extremely
difficult to ever 'conclude, after careful study, that the law provides [any
determinate] answer.' If such lawyers are not included, determinacy will have
been achieved by hypothetically polling only those lawyers that already
believe that determinacy is possible. Intended as a non-controversial and
itself neutral standard of determinacy, Greenawalt' s proposal falls afoul
the indeterminacy critique: it confirms rather than refutes the contingent and
inescapable politics of law. Meaning and determinacy are not properties of
the law itself but a function of agreement among lawyers about its relevant
informing contexts. Indeed , as the example of a professional legal
community confirms, many of the judgments and much of the agreement that
Wittgenstein argues makes language work is brought about 'through
training, drill and the forms of our life. '70 To be a lawyer is to talk like a
lawyer and to talk like a lawyer is as much about the inculcation of social
values and attitudes as it is about the learning of legal rules and technical
words.
\

Hart and soul
In 1978, MacCormick felt confident enough to state that 'no one has ever
advanced' an assault upon easy cases.71 By this he meant that there existed
cases in which the application of the rules to the facts was beyond reasonable

dispute; the jurisprudential action was more around the incidence, identity and
resolution of hard cases. However, the sceptical account of law launches just
such a full-frontal assault. It challenges the distinction between hard and easy
cases and contends that all cases are vulnerable to sceptical disruption. Indeed,
an uncompromising scepticism is devastating to traditional jurists' intellectual
peace of mind because it not only disputes the naturalist claims made for the
adjudication of hard cases, but also strikes at the hard core of the positivist
thesis. In no uncertain terms, a sceptical account of law insists that there never
is simply an easy fact of the legal matter; it is indeterminacy all the way down.
The sceptical life of the law is both the indeterminate logic of its own
contingent experience and the indeterminate experience of its own contingent
logic.

The hard core
For Hartian positivists, the existence of easy cases is essential for a positivist
analysis and as a justification of its jurisprudential raison d 'etre. This commitment
flows from their basic thesis that law is a matter of social fact and that there is
a conceptual separation between those facts and the law as it ought to be. If
there were not easy cases, and a considerable number of them, law could
not be considered as a social fact independent of moral considerations; it
would be entirely a matter of judgment and an occasion for the exercise of strong
discretion. While Hart does not claim that rule application is logical, he does
argue that there are 'a vast number' of determinate rules whose application
will be obvious and unproblematic in the bulk of cases.72 Although absolute

certainty is not an achievable goal and 'a margin of uncertainty should be
tolerated and indeed welcomed,' Hart concedes that, for the positivist claim to
hold true, there must be an operational degree of certainty or else 'there is no
central element of actual law to be seen in the core of settled meaning which
rules have. m While Hart is right to point out the experience that lawyers and
judges have of 'the core of settled meaning,' he is mistaken to treat 'the core
of settled meaning' as a feature 'that rules have' and to consider that core or
meaning as 'settled' in anything but the most temporary, provisional or
contingent way. 'The core of settled meaning' is only central, settled and
meaningful until the next roll of the hermeneutical or litigational dice.
As Hart so compellingly shows, the formulation and application of rules is
fraught with uncertainty and difficulty. In his three-step process of inductive,
deductive and discretionary decision, judges have plenty of institutional room to
manoeuvre. 74 However, once it is recognised that this takes place within the
structural and endemic indeterminacy of discursive practice, a depiction of
rulebased adjudication as factual and easy is far wide of the scholarly mark. The
appeal of rules is also their greatest weakness. By trying to generalise
inductively from particular circumstances and then later to particularise
deductively from general statements, rule-based theories of law overlook the
main sceptical insight that judging is 'all in the details' and that those details
are constantly being reconfigured. Rules arise from and speak to social relations
that are always subject to change and only have any particular meaning as a
result of their consideration within a specific politico-historical context.
Moreover, that context is never selfevident but demands an act of delineation

that implicates values and power: 'the question can be raised not whether a
politics is implied (it always is), but which politics is implied in . . . a practice
of contextualisation. '75
As a matter of professional training and social custom, rule application does
not lend itself to a definitive account of what it is to follow a rule. To
declare that someone has followed or obeyed a rule correctly is to say little
more than they did something the same 'as we do it. '7 The question is not
whether there are rules or whether they are relied upon they clearly are.
However, they do not exist as canonical directives that can impersonally
dispose of cases without interpretive intervention; the meaning of a rule and
its application never simply is. Rules determine nothing except customary
reactions and dominant practices. As a social practice, rule application is not
an analytical issue of formal realisability or causal necessity; conformity with
is not the same as caused by. This agnosticism is what distinguishes the
sceptic from the positivists and the nihilists. Simply providing the next number
in a series is not the same as justifying this manoeuvre as a necessary
following of a particular rule. In the same way that Newton's Law of Gravity
did not cause or account for the apple falling, rules do not cause anything to
happen. In matters of social behaviour, the most that a rule can do is to help
understand whether the participants in such behaviour believe that they are
following such a rule. As Wittgenstein concluded in justifying behaviour, 'the
rule is . . . what is explained, not what does the explaining. '77 Rules are
rough-and-ready indicators or markers of earlier values that other judges have
been persuaded had sufficient agreement within or appeal to the relevant

discursive community. In a non-trivial sense, therefore, every application of a
rule is a remaking of the rule. Rule application is an occasion on which judges
acknowledge, consciously or unconsciously, the values that hold certain social
practices in place. As such, adjudication, no less than lawyering, is through
and through about values, not facts, and about persuasion, not demonstration.
Applying rules is a political matter of taking sides: the only questions are
which and when.
As regards the traditional distinction between easy and hard cases, it
should by now be clear that a sceptical account of law has no truck with it or
need for it. In short, there are no hard cases or easy cases: there are only
cases. 'Easiness' is not a property or quality that inheres within a case or rule.
Rules and their application do not arise or make sense outside of an
interpretive context. The easiness or hardness of cases derives from
background facts about agreements in judgments, historical contexts and
social stability. What goes on in easy cases is the same as in hard cases,
only that its context is less contested and more taken for granted. In this
sense, Hart is correct when he states that easy cases occur where 'there is
general agreement that they fall within the scope of a rule, '78 provided that the
emphasis is firmly on the fact of 'general agreement' and not, as Hart seems
to put it, on 'the scope of the rule.' The fact of this 'general agreement'
(whether a matter of social consensus or social hierarchy) is important the
greater its extent and strength, the greater the existential experience of easy
cases and legal certainty. 79 Nevertheless, no matter how extensive or deep the
agreement is, it does not alter the fact that easiness can never become an

intrinsic feature of the rule itself. The temptation to mistake dominant ways
of thinking for natural necessity must be studiously resisted; the process is so
ingrained and uncontroversial as to appear as if the process did not occur.
My claim, therefore, that many cases are easy and that, as Hart says, 'general
terms would be useless to us as a medium of communication unless there
were such familiar, generally unchallenged cases' (p 123) requires that
'unchallenged' be understood in the postmodern sense as unchallenged in the
present social circumstances. After all, easy cases are as much a product of
hermeneutical interpretation as hard cases; they are not an occasion to forego
the necessity for such interpretation.
There are two strands of critical response to the sceptical account of easy
cases and what it means to take rules seriously the 'weird and bizarre'
and the 'obvious and trite.' The first claims that there are some factual
applications of rules that are so far-fetched and ludicrous as to be clearly
outside the sope of the rule and cannot ever reasonably count as potential
interpretations of the rule. For instance, Greenawalt observes that 'no
plausible formulation of the statutory crime of theft, under present social
conditions, will include the ordinary act of scratching one's nose. '80 But
examples like this seem to miss the whole point of the sceptical account.
It is not the rule or its formulation that is determinative, but the social
context and what is considered relevant in it that is significant. The
constraints are more on people's imagination who but a Da Vinci could have
imagined cars, computers or spaceships in centuries of old? than on the
interpretive possibilities imposed by a rule's linguistic expression. In any

circumstances in which the 'bizarre' or 'weird' situation would actually arise,
the reasonableness of the interpretation would be much less implausible and
much more contestable. 81 Greenawalt himself underscores this by qualifying
his observation as only being itself plausible 'under present

social

conditions. ' In other words, the resort to outrageous examples actually
underlines the force and extent of the indeterminacy critique if, in matters of
theft, everything else goes, other than acts like scratching one's nose, then
the extent of determinate and plausible meaning is so great as to offer no
practicable constraints on rule application at all.
The second response insists that there are some circumstances that are so
obvious and trite that, even under present social conditions, their status as
easy cases cannot seriously be challenged in that the appropriate outcome of
applying a rule is beyond serious dispute. For instance, when contemplating
Hart's rule that 'no vehicles may be taken into the park,' even a critical Fuller
agrees that there is 'no need to worry about the difference between Fords and
Cadillacs. '82 Such a bold pronouncement is premature. While it may well be
that, in most situations and for most people, the make of car will not be
relevant, it does not follow that it will be so in all possible situations. Again, it
is the determination of context that is vital, not the rule's formulation. There are
a number of circumstances in which the make of car might be treated as
significant in the application of the rule. At a Ford factory or recreational
facility, 'vehicles' might have come to be interpreted as prohibiting only those
cars that are not made by Ford, such as Cadillacs; the obvious rationale being
that there is an important difference between cars made by the park's owner

and anyone else and that Ford wants to encourage its employees to drive only
its own cars. After all, any scheme of discourse, of which law is the example
par excellence, that could once refuse to count women as persons and later
make women into men, seems a strange arena of human communication to
insist and rely upon the determinacy, relative or otherwise, of language. 83
Accordingly, both criticisms serve to confirm that which they claim to
condemn the difference between the resolution of easy and hard cases is
not one of intrinsic identity or separate processes, but one of relative
obviousness based on situated assessments of relevant social contexts and
agreements. Although my sceptical account stresses imagination over
technique and persuasion over demonstration, it does not commit me to
the untenable or nihilistic position that it will always be possible to make the
application of a rule come out in the way that the judge wants it to.
Sometimes, cars are vehicles and horses are not. But this is a matter of
rhetorical achievement, not objective truth or ahistorical determinacy. In such
circumstances, it does not mean that the sceptical account has failed to give a
cogent or realistic account of law and judging. On the contrary, the very fact
that scepticism accepts the existential experience of rule-boundedness is what
makes it cogent and realistic. Without some explanation or place for that fact,
a postmodern view of law would be sadly deficient in terms of its own
commitment to situated and engaged forms of understanding and
evaluation. Moreover, as almost all theorists and lawyers will agree,
because a case cannot be brought within a rule, it does not follow that the case
must fail. Even under arch-formalist accounts of law, judges can either

fashion an exception to a rule or amend the rule. As Hart states, 'a rule that
ends with the word "unless . . ." is still a rule. '84

Sceptical judging
Despite their differences, what unites traditional jurists of a naturalist or
positivist persuasion is their fear that, without a plausible theory and
realisable

practice

of bounded

rule

application,

law

will

become

indistinguishable from open-ended political wrangling; adjudication will
degenerate into a series of ad hoc encounters in which justice will 'be left to
the unguided, even if experienced, sage sitting under the spreading oak tree.'
85

However, like most spectres, the threat of nihilistic hordes waiting to

ransack the juridical citadel of principled decision-making is as much as
anything else the figment of a fevered jurisprudential .imagination33: it says
more about the insecurities of the legal establishment than it does about the
aspirations of the juristic rebels. Accordingly in this section, I will draw
together the various fragments on what it means to take rules sceptically, and
present a more sustained account of what a sceptical approach to judging does
and does not entail. In particular, I will address the neglected issue of what the
qualities of a good sceptical judge might be.
The possibility of sceptical judging is lampooned as, at best , oxymoronic
and as, at worst, simply moronic. It is suggested that a sceptical approach to
rules denies the existence of rules and therefore undercuts the possibility of
anything that might reasonably be recognised as judging; all is mere pretence
and decision-making is an indulgent will-to-power. For example, in an

otherwise sophisticated and restrained monograph, Waluchow accuses
critical legal scholars generally of adopting a rule scepticism:
according to which there are in actual fact no binding rules at all and judges simply decide
cases on grounds of their own choosing. These grounds might be political, moral or personal.
Judges only pretend to be following rules when what they are in fact doing is rationalising their
blatant, and often abusive and reactionary, exercise of political power. 86

This is the stuff of rank caricature. Although nihilist critics in their more
polemical moments might have given unfortunate credibility to such
assessments, this dystopian vision of sceptical judging is neither warranted nor
inevitable. While some judges and academics might well engage in the
occasional cynical manipulation of rules and ought to be held to account for
such intellectual or political ingenuity, it is far from radical scepticism's claim
that rules cannot or ought not to be taken seriously; what more often occurs is
the good faith attempt to interpret and apply a rule so as to produce a
satisfactory result. Judges do follow and apply rules, but what is the relevant
rule and what it means to follow or apply it is always up for grabs.
Consequently, for postmodernists, law remains primarily a system of rules,
provided that its existence and operation is understood in a radically sceptical
sense.
The common allegation that under a sceptical account 'rules serve not as
sources of ex ante guidance, but as vehicles of ex post legitimation of
decisions reached without regard for the rules,' is mistaken. 87 The sceptical
claim actually made is that judges do not stand outside the rules but inhabit
the rules in a particular way. They are always situated within a context of
freedom and constraint -never fully constrained nor ever entirely free. Judges

give meaning to rules and their own lives in the constant struggle to
negotiate the forces of freedom and constraint that constitute the rules
and their own lives; they are freely constrained and constrainedly free.
Indeed, freedom and constraint can only be made sense of reciprocally.
The

rule-engaged

judge

is

neither

context-dependent

nor

contexttranscendent; the rules and the rule user are enmeshed in a
mutually affecting relationship. 88 Thus, a sceptical account of adjudication
takes seriously both the restrictive pull of rules and the liberating push of
interpretation. One can neither dispense with rules nor with interpretation;
each is what makes the other tick. Within a postmodern version of law there
is not only no set of rules that stands apart from interpretive attempts at
hermeneutical appropriation, but there is no literal interpretation one that
claims to be transparently representational rather than opaquely constitutive against which other interpretations can be contrasted. Similarly, a postmodern
approach is suitably sceptical about the traditional insistence that whenever
judges attend to the consequences of applying a rule they are no longer
applying the rule in any serious sense. It is willingly acknowledged that,
whatever else they might be doing, judges are not engaged in rule application
when they deliberately use rules as ex post justifications for decisions.
However, sceptics argue that some resort to consequences is an unavoidably
practical feature of rule application if 'resort to consequences' is used by
traditionalists to refer to certain aspects of the rules' informing context. Without
reference to something beyond the verbal formulation of the rule itself, it is
nonsensical to talk about rule application. As I have been at pains to

demonstrate, rule application only makes sense as a dynamic exercise in
normative judgment,

not as a passive act of unreflective conformity.

Consequently, sceptics are only troubled when judges attend to consequences
and nothing else ; that is, when they forego or ignore their own good faith
attempts at interpretation of the rules. The fact that judges arrive at different or
even contradictory applications of particular rules is less of a concern than the
failure of judges to take the rules seriously. While judges are obligated to
apply rules, they are not obliged to reach certain decisions. Of course, to
concede that there may be several applications of a rule that count as valid or
legitimate is to confirm that law is rife with indeterminacy and that judging is
riven with choices. As such, traditional jurists need not so much fear that
anything goes as a matter of judicial decision that judges might decide cases on
the basis of a coin toss, the litigant's hair colour, astrological charts or the like
-but that, as a matter of rule application and through a process of rational
disagreement, judges might justify almost any outcome. Again, a sceptical
practice does not reduce itself to brute preference nor dispense with the
possibility of rational debate. Scepticism simply insists that the idea of
rational debate be understood and practised in a suitably
sceptical way.
As Hart stresses, any credible description of rule application must be able
to account for the beliefs of participants as to what they are doing or think
they are doing. While legal theorists need not share or endorse the beliefs of
participants in the legal community, they must offer an explanation of that
behaviour as it is understood by its participants. Consequently, the fact that

judges experience themselves applying and being morally bound by rules is a
vital factor that cannot be ignored, even if it need not be endorsed or shared:
'description may still be description, even when what is described is an
evaluation. '89 Nothing that I have said contravenes this injunction. My
sceptical account of what it is to take rules seriously accepts that a rule's
existence will be relevant to the question of what judges do and should do.
However, the need to incorporate judges' feeling of bindingness leaves open the
key issue of how to fix what it is that that bindingness applies to namely, the
rule's meaning. Notwithstanding Hart's emphasis on the beliefs of insiders, he
posits a false tension between those who 'accept and voluntarily co-operate in
maintaining the rules' and those who 'reject the rules and attend to them only
. . . as a possible sign of punishment. '90 In so far as this division is
intended to undercut the sceptics' claims about rules, it only bites if there
is some largely objective, determinate and uncontroversial way to ascertain
the meaning of rules. Because there is no such method, it is a toothless
distinction. As I have tried to show throughout, the sceptical judge both
'accepts' rather than 'rejects' the rules and, at the same time, 'maintains'
them as only 'a possible sign of punishment. '
Despite the apocalpytic predictions and dire warnings of traditional
scholars, there is nothing about my approach that will necessarily change how
judges actually apply rules. A different appreciation of what it is to apply a
rule has no necessary impact on the practice of rule application: theory does
not alter practice in and of itself. Judges and lawyers will still go on
interpreting particular rules in particular ways. But what might change is the

cogency and bindingness of particular applications in particular circumstances
in light of the altered theoretical understanding of what it means to apply a rule:
'once we admit the rules are mutable and inextricable from material social
practice, we will at least experience a psychological change in the way we
perceive our roles as legal actors. '91 There will still be general agreement on
what particular rules mean and individual judges will still experience exactly
the same degree of (in)determinacy, but the vital justification for that result
will be subverted and the question of authority will be challenged. Judges will
no longer be able to claim that 'the rule made me do it,' but will have to take
greater responsibility for judicial decisions and their social consequences.
Ifjudges believe that they should follow rules for the simple reason that they

are rules, they will be lost when the rules are ambiguous or run out.
Democratic responsibility is not about unthinking obeisance to external
rules; the denial of complexity and ambiguity in the service of the Rule of
Law is the epitome of irresponsible behaviour. Instead, sceptical judges
understand that their institutional duty is best fulfilled by taking stands on
particular rules and being accountable for those choices. Indeed, Hart himself
accepted that scepticism had two major and beneficial effects for the
adjudicative enterprise -the practical and the political:
first, that [judges] should always suspect, although not always in the end reject, any claim that
existing legal rules or precedents were constraints strong and complete enough to
determine what a court's decision should be without other extra-legal considerations;
secondly, that judges should not seek to bootleg silently into the law their own conceptions of the
law's aims or justice or social policy or other extra-legal elements required for decision, but
should openly identify and discuss them.92

In prescient fashion, Hart was hinting, even if he did not concede, that the
battery of adjudicative techniques for rule application did not amount to a
selfcontained technology: they only made sense as part of a larger
understanding of law as a rhetorical enterprise. Always a part of and not apart
from power, law is a discourse of persuasion. Within such an understanding,
non-apologetic legal theory demands a vigorous hermeneutics of scepticism that
can penetrate the heavy jurisprudential camouflage in which power habitually
disguises its insidious legal operation. While these competing strategies of
adjudication are passed off as ideologically unaligned, they are rhetorical
resources in a continuing struggle for the hermeneutical soul of law; their
impact and success will vary with context and audience. Any meaning that gels
is a rhetorical function of a temporary and provisional agreement between
contending parties, not a lasting or concluding recognition of a pre-existing
ground for interpretive truth. However, there is nothing arbitrary or capricious
about this process; values, convictions and interpretations are no less real or
compelling because they are contingent and historical. And they are no more
real or compelling because they are underwritten by the spurious logic of some
pseudo-neutral interpretive strategy. As Fish puts it, '[not] all rhetorical
constructions are equal, just that they are equally rhetorical. '93 In the sceptical
almanac, the logic of the law is the rhetorical experience of life.

A new craft
What would be the qualities of good sceptical judges? What kind of people
would make the best sceptical judges? While they would possess adequate

technical skills, like a sophisticated grasp of rule application, these notoriously
formal and abstract talents would not be central to a transformed practice of
adjudication. Under sceptical tutelage, law becomes a practical activity in
which judges would bear more resemblance to artists than technicians.
Lawyers' highest achievement is not a reduction of law's materials to an
elaborate and exhaustive system of rules; the effect, if not the intent, of a limited
depiction of lawyers' special and distinctive expertise is that it too easily
functions as a ruse for relieving themselves of the democratic responsibility
to justify their power and authority by recourse to the real-world pressure of
getting the job done. However, the best legal craftspersons are not those who
simply reproduce mechanically and mindlessly old arguments and trite
analogies, but those who can rework legal materials in an imaginative and
stylish way.94 To be worthy of their professional prestige, lawyers and judges
must nurture a sense of social justice and a feel for political vision unless they
are to become only hired hands for vested interests: 'technique without ideals
is a menace; ideals without technique are a mess. '95 A bare legal craft can too
easily acquire the elite habits of a masonic order and fail to meet the civic
specifications of its official calling: a job well done is not always its own
reward. Lawyers must be technicians, but they must also be designers and
innovators who place their practised craft in the service of the disadvantaged
and disenfranchised in society. As things presently stand, legal craft seems
designed to serve only its own parochial and formalist ends.
The informing image of postmodern lawyers and judges is of industrial
artists. Working with whatever materials are at hand, they mix and match

them in an imaginative way that is a contingent expression of their artistic
convictions about truth, beauty, justice, etc in a modern society. Unhindered
by debates about the true nature of art or the correctness of artistic insight, the
excellence of their craft is in their connectedness with the world, not some
arcane retreat from it. Industrial artists are industrial precisely because they do
not live exclusively in the studio, deal exclusively with paints and canvas, and
speak exclusively to dealers and critics. Indeed, they are industrial in part
because their contribution so often disappears into the product, blended with
the contribution of other artists. But it is also bent to the discipline of
technology, market constraints, popular tastes, union rules and other forces
which marginalise them and their artistic aspirations and talents. The effect
of this, over time, is to habituate them to their role in industry and to cause
them to distance themselves from the effete world of Art. But, at the same
time, they are changing industry by the improvements that they are able to
make in the practicality, aesthetics and cost-efficiency of kettles and cars.
For lawyers or artists the best accolades are earned not for their technical
prowess but their capacity to engender local hope in the struggle to transform
experience, to overcome suffering and to endow others with opportunities to
remake their own world.96
To accomplish such a task, emphasis will be placed on the substantive
qualities that judges possess as individuals and citizens. It is people who have a
diversity of experience, who can open themselves to the situations of others and
who value the worth of compassion, sensitivity and humanity. While it will
not disqualify the hard-headed or the unsentimental, such a revised judicial

mandate will require the capacity to be creative and imaginative in the use of
rules. In so doing, such judges will not be acting in an arbitrary, idiosyncratic or
ideological way. By working to bring their values and commitments to
articulate consciousness in order to understand and interrogate them, they will
be acting with the candour that democracy expects and taking responsibility
for what they do in a way democracy encourages. By rejecting the hackneyed
and unsustainable notion of an entirely differentiated role, judges might begin
to gain the respect of the public and themselves. In the same way that 'good
oratory is a good person speaking well, '97 so good judging is a good person
acting well. Of course, the notion of what qualities or characteristics go to
make up the 'good person' is itself always open to debate and disagreement.
Similarly, there is no magical guide to be followed as to what judges should
do or how they should do it in any specific or conflicted situation. Sceptical
judges will not shy away from a resort to values and will ensure that those
values are always kept in play, that they remain open to reconsideration and
that responsibility is taken for them.
Accordingly, by celebrating the fact that law is the continuation of politics
by other rhetorical means, sceptical judges will recognise their inevitable role as
agents of political activism. Rather than talk with Dworkin and Fuller about
the common law 'working itself pure,' sceptical judges will be content to know
that, through their own efforts and imagination, the law is simply 'working
itself. '98 However, none of this should be taken as implying that, when
released from its allegiance to traditional prescriptions, judicial caution should
be thrown to the wind and the courts begin to operate as a clearing house for

all political disputes and policy-making. As formalists rightly note, 'giving
away the traditional store . . . would be drastic and dangerous . . . unlikely to
help the less powerful members of society. '99 The postmodern challenge is to
transform the courts so that they abandon their formalist ways and accept
their political responsibility; it is not a ploy to usurp democratic authority
from citizens at large.
Along with any efforts to re-vision the judicial craft in line with a more
sceptical and democratic optic, it will be essential to ensure that the sites for
democratic dialogue are actively multiplied so that a broader range of voices
could be heard in society's policy-making. There is only so much that courts
can or should do in a society that is committed to democratic governance.
Nonetheless, in so far as courts are likely to play some role in the practice and
theory of democratic justice, it will be imperative to work toward a situation in
which the personnel of the courts are diversified and democratised. On the
basis that different people bring different experience to the task of applying
rules, the need to ensure that the elite ranks of the judicial and legal
profession are opened up along more varied class, gender, racial, ethnic,
sexual and political lines is paramount. Of course, the appointment of women,
black or gay judges will not guarantee change or make the law more
progressive. It is mistaken to believe that anything necessarily follows from
the identity or experience of a judge: it is as wrong to attribute a homogeneity
of views to disadvantaged groups as it is to pretend that those views will not
be different to those of advantaged groups. Nonetheless, the increased
presence of such people will increase the likelihood that a different perspective

and vision of justice will be brought to bear upon the adjudicative process.
While there are not nor can there be any metaphysical certainties, the
institutional chances of transforming law and judging are greatly improved by
opening it up to those excluded for so long: robust dialogue is more conducive
to the democratic temperament and civic advancement than insulated
monologues. This affirmative vision of sceptical judging 'is not radical in
itself but is radical in the context of the prevailing orthodoxy.' 100
Similarly, within a postmodern legal culture, the role and representation of
the jury would be greatly expanded. As an occasion for democratic
devolution, jury empowerment would bring a neglected challenge to the
aristocratic instincts of legal professionalism and might invigorate the timbre
and range of dialogic debates. Moreover, it would represent a postmodern
putsch against the legal hierocracy. By changing the civic members of the jury
from passive observers to active participants, the legal process might begin to
fulfil its democratic commitments. After all, law involves the lives of society's
citizens and is much too important to be left to lawyers. Moreover, by
withdrawing the fate of the polity from the clutches of lawyers, it might
become possible for citizens to overcome the dispiriting belief that, unless
there is something large, powerful and ahistorical on their side to support their
claims -like the law -they need not assert their right to govern themselves. 101
A revitalised jury system is one way to relieve the symptoms of democratic
ennui and to prevent further political disempowerment.

Shovelling smoke
If, as Oliver Wendell Holmes said, 'lawyers spend a great deal of time
shovelling smoke,' 102 then legal theorists devote an even greater deal of time
to producing it. Under the guise of elucidation, too much jurisprudential
writing tends to mystify law and adjudication. On the other hand, a sceptical
account works as a gust of fresh air to blow away much of the juristic fog that
shrouds the doings of judges; it seeks to lay bare, not do away with, the
creative craft of rule application. As part of a larger postmodern project, the
ambition is not so much to dispel the uncertainty and complexity that is
inherent in the adjudicative task, but to understand it better and encourage
judges and critics to turn it to transformative effect. With a healthy sceptical
attitude, judges might immunise themselves from the formalist contagion that
both positivists and naturalists continue to spread. In this way, not only will
lawyers begin to appreciate that they are engaged in a language game of
rhetorical politics, they might accept that adjudication and rule application is
not an escape from political responsibility but one of the most compelling
occasions for its dutiful antl satisfying discharge.
In substantiating a sceptical account of law and rules, I hope to have
calmed implicit Hartian fears that, without the hard core of settled meaning,
there cannot be law 'in some centrally important sense' and 'the notion of
rules controlling courts' decisions is senseless'; this is an unwarranted
indictment of responsible scepticism and participatory democracy.
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It is

simply not the case that, unless words have a context-transcendent meaning,
the possibility of governance according to law will have vanished and anarchy

will be loosed on an unsuspecting populace. While there is never a hard core
of settled meaning, there is often a soft centre of temporary meaning. There
are, no doubt, instances of cynical rule manipulation by judges and
lawyers, but there is nothing in my postmodern refocusing of rule-based
adjudication that denies or compromises Hart's observation that 'for the
most part decisions . . . are reached . . . by genuine effort to conform to rules
consciously taken as guiding standards of decision. '104 However, my
sceptical approach does insist that nothing necessarily follows from making a
'genuine effort to conform to rules consciously taken as guiding standards
of decision.' Moreover, the idea and practice of sceptical judging is best suited
to the political ambitions of a modern polity that aspires to be truly
democratic.
For Hart, the realists' tendency to treat rules as 'playthings'
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was to be

strenuously resisted. When characterised in a nihilistic and trivialising vein,
this reaction is understandable. But when the 'play' of rule application is
understood in the more serious sceptical sense, it becomes much less
disturbing and much more attractive. It begins to capture the style and
substance of a postmodern politics in which citizens, including judges, are
empowered by the recognition that rules are always up for grabs and that
struggles to apply them partake of life's fluidity. Of course, such a view of
politics as 'playful impertinence' might be seen to be indulgent and offensive
to those whose lives are lived under economic and social oppression. To this
objection there is no better response than that the practice of 'politics as play'
offers the most seripus and pertinent challenge to such suffering. Under the

view of law and life as an infinite game, play ceases to be only a pastime and
relief from the grinding earnstness of life and rule application. Instead, it
becomes an activity of living that is intended to permeate all situations of
social interaction and that strives to 'open[ ] political spaces for agonistic
relations of adversarial respect. '106 Within these patches of instability,
conflicts of power might be challenged and robbed of their absolute and final
predetermination in a way that ordinary politics and finite games do not. None of
this suggests that there would be an anarchic lack of standards; there would be
new and changing standards that combine the playful and the serious in a
defiantly pluralistic amalgam of style and substance.
Within this sceptical understanding of law and politics, political players are
capable of imagining and opening themselves up to possibilities other than those
presently available. They are not actors in another's story, but they are committed
to be 'joyful poets of the story that continues to originate what they cannot
finish.' 107 In such a postmodern society, politics is not something that people
choose to do, but something that people always live. Consequently, when involved
in the play of rule application, judges and jurists can continue to produce and
shovel smoke or they can come clean on their political affiliations in a more open
and responsible way. By taking rules sceptically and by diversifying the judicial
ranks, the courts can become one more venue for the infinite game of democratic
transformation. Moreover, in doing this it might be possible to confound and
remedy Hart's complaint that 'in law, as elsewhere, we can know and yet not
understand.' 108 Suitably read and re-viewed, The Concept of Law still has a major
role to play in that progressive challenge.
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